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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JOSEPH G. TOOMBS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
JACK DONALD TOOMBS, ROLAND
J. TOOMBS, individually and as
Guardian ad litem of the said Jack
Donald Toombs, a minor; ALMA
TOOMBS, EDRIS GLASMANN, and
J. M. TOOMBS,

Case No.
8665

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant in his statement of facts deals only very
generally with the facts of this case and uses this statement
to detail the proceedings had in this case and to comment
upon the pleadings and the respective claims and allega-
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tions of the parties. Under Points I and II of his argument,
the appellant attempts to detail the evidence presented at
the trial and it must be here noted that, in order to support his contention of error on the part of the trial court,
appellant recites only that evidence favorable to him. Even
in cases of this kind, it is customary to rely upon the trial
judge's findings as to the facts where there is evidence to
support those findings as he alone had the opportunity of
listening to the witnesses, observing their demeanor and of
determining the 'veight and credence to be given each of
them.
On page 2 of his brief appellant details the family
relationship of the plaintiff and the defendants and then
says "It is therefore evident that the defendants are in close
relationship one with the other, not only by family but also
by reason of their activities conjointly in operating land
adjacent to the Cedar Springs land in Box Elder County."
It is respectfully submitted that the only evidence of this
close relationship in the entire record is the above statement of counsel. The plaintiff fed cattle for the defendant,
Alma Toombs, in 1904 and 1905 (R. 45) and worked for
this same defendant in those same years (R. 42), and had
one real estate transaction 'vith him evidently at about the
same time, although the evidence presented does not specify
the year (R. 45).
We believe that this statement of facts should contain
the facts as presented by the evidence elicited at the trial
and that the better way to present them by brief is with
reference to the plaintiff's complaint in order that this
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Court may have the opportunity to clearly see what was
claimed and what was proved and wherein the proof was
lacking.
The amended complaint of the plaintiff (R. 500 and
501) alleges that title to the land in question was taken in
the name of J. M. Toombs by deed on or about March 21,
1913, and that the plaintiff was and is the owner of a onethird interest in said land; that the said J. M. Toombs openly
acknowledged the interest of the plaintiff; that in the month
of July, 1948, the said J. M. Toombs, who is the plaintiff's
father, conveyed the land by vvarranty deed to Edris Glasmann, the plaintiff's sister, who was originally a party
to this action, and plaintiff alleges that said conveyance was
in trust to convey to him the one-third interest mentioned
above and to sell to him the remaining one-third for "an
amount to be agreed upon between the parties, which said
amount was to be the reasonable value of said land and
not what the same might be purchased for on competitive
bidding." This amended complaint further claimed that
Edris G·lasmann well knew that plaintiff was the owner of
a one-third interest in this land and accepted the trust just
above described but thereafter failed to execute the terms
of this trust; and the complaint originally sought damages
against both the plaintiff's sister and father, Edris Glasmann and J. M. Toombs.
The actual evidence introduced showed that plaintiff's
claimed ownership was based upon work performed for
his father during the year 1905 and consisted of feeding
cattle for a period of five and one-half months (R. 41 and
42). There is not an iota of other or additional evidence
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to support this alleged one-third interest and we earnestly
suggest that the claim is as ridiculous as it sounds. All of
the evidence introduced in support of the so-called constructive trust negatives this alleged interest. Under the new
rules of civil procedure it is apparently possible to take inconsistent positions as far as the pleadings are concerned,
but we do not believe it to be proper to maintain inconsistent
positions after judgment and upon appeal. However, the
plaintiff appellant continues to do so_ in this case; and his
evidence and that of his witness, Arnold Christensen, conclusively show that he was attempting to purchase the
entire property from his sister, and the plaintiff at this
stage of the proceeding never asserted his alleged one-third
interest.
On page 10 of appellant's brief the following statement
appears: "Exhibit 3 was admitted in evidence (R. 109110) ." We have carefully read the two pages of the record
referred to and do not find that this exhibit was there admitted and on page 111 of the record the trial court with
reference to Exhibit 3 states:
"I think I'll take this under advisement and
study this for a little while."
Neither the reporter in his index nor the writers of this
brief after a careful review of the entire record can find
that this Exhibit 3 was ever admitted into evidence. It
was, therefore, most improper for the appellant to quote
from this Exhibit in his brief and we desire to emphasize
this impropriety as it is the only place in this entire record
where any person besides the plaintiff himself made any
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statement affirmatively as to this claimed one-third interest.
And it is only proper to note that the Exhibit was an affidavit made by a ninety year old man on October 18, 1948,
som.e three months after he had executed a warranty deed
to this same property to his daughter and some 43 years
after the alleged consideration was supposedly furnished to
establish this fictitious interest. And the Exhibit does not
even mention that the interest was one-third but is silent
in this respect. The exhibit was patently inadmissible.
The amended complaint claimed that the plaintiff's
sister accepted the conveyance in trust from plaintiff's
father to convey to him the alleged one-third and to sell to
him the remainder. The evidence of the plaintiff's two
sisters, Deo Louise Gale (R. 290-299) and Edris Glasmann
(R. 390-415), not only do not support such a trust and its
acceptance, but completely negative any such a claim. And
finally we must note that, although plaintiff's amended
complaint joined both his father and his sister, Edris Glasmann, and sought $2500.00 damages against them, the file
does not show that they were ever served with summons
and the record does show that the matter was dismissed
as to these two defendants. In connection with the discussion as to constructive trusts, it will be necessary to again
refer to this dismissal.
Paragraph 8 of said amended complaint attempts to
lay the foundation for the constructive trust by charging
Alma Toombs with the making of certain alleged promises
(R. 502). Paragraph 9 alleges a confidential relationship,
paragraph 10 the breach and paragraph 11 that the
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claimed representations of Alma Toombs were fraudulell
(R. 503).

With respect to Alma Toombs, he testified that he di~
go to Ogden for the plaintiff, talked with the plaintiff'
sisters and reported to the plaintiff "I told him I wouldn'
buy the property for him, because he could buy it just a
well as I could" (R. 330). Lillian Toombs, Alma's wifE
confirmed this statement (R. 368, 369) . As to the allege~
confidential relationship, we have heretofore in the secon1
paragraph of this brief commented upon it and again urg,
that this Court scrutinize this claim most carefully. To u
it is apparent that the plaintiff appellant has assumed sue]
a confidential relationship to exist merely because he allege
in his amended complaint that it did. We have searche~
the record and the evidence is wholly lacking.

This same amended complaint alleges that the prom
ises of the defendant, Alma Toombs, were fraudulent an<
the record again remains silent as to any proof of fraud
It "'ould require an unbridled imagination to even infe1
anything fraudulent from the entire record in this case.

The record in this case is uncontradicted that the de
fendants, Alma Toombs and Roland Thomas, each paid one
half of the purchase price of this property when the sam~
was sold by Edris Glasmann and title thereto taken in th'
name of the defendant, Jack Donald Toombs (R. 268 an<
Exhibit F). And Jack Donald Toombs has since repaid hi~
grandfather, Alma Toombs, a good part of the purchas~
price so advanced by him (Exhibits M and N). But a mos·
careful reading of the amended complaint filed by the plain
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tiff in this cause reveals that Jack Donald Toombs and
Roland Toombs are named as defendants in the title of the
case, are mentioned in paragraphs one and two where the
parties and their residences are delineated, are mentioned
in paragraphs four and twelve in connection with a claimed
eviction of the plaintiff of which no proof was offered, and
Jack Donald Toombs is named in paragraph ten as the
party in whose name the deed was taken. Neither of these
defendants is charged in the complaint with having done
a single act as far as the plaintiff is concerned; and, at the
best and giving plaintiff credit for everything he testified
to, the only claim that can be made against these defendants
was that they had been informed that the plaintiff made
some claim to the land in question. But the plaintiff's
sister, who was selling this property, did not even recognize this interest.
We believe the fair inference of all of the evidence
clearly supports the ruling of the trial court in refusing to
impose a constructive trust in this case. First, he was entitled to believe the defendant, Alma Toombs, and the witnesses who corroborated him, to the effect that he advised
the plaintiff that he would not bid for him as he could do
it just as well himself. Second, there was not a scintilla of
evidence, nor was there any pleading, under which any
type of constructive trust could be imposed as to the defendants, Jack Donald Toombs and Roland J. Toombs. They
made no promises to the plaintiff and were under absolutely
no obligation to him. At this point we would ask the Court
to observe the two letters sent from A. L. Glasmann to the
plaintiff and to the defendant, Roland Toombs, each dated
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October 14, 1948, and marked Exhibits "A" and "J", respectively. The defendant, Roland Toombs, testified that
the plaintiff showed him Exhibit A, being the letter sent
the plaintiff, and that he read to the plaintiff the letter he
had received which is Exhibit J (R. 427). This testimony is
not contradicted.
The two letters above referred to both stated that an
offer had been received for the property and that it was
the intention to complete the sale on October 19, 1948; and
both the plaintiff and the defendant, Roland Toombs, were
advised that this was in effect their last opportunity to bid
on this property. Roland's testimony (R. 426) is to the
effect that he told the plaintiff that he did intend to bid
further on it and to the further effect that the plaintiff
informed him that he was not interested, that the price was
too high and that he would not bid further. This evidence
is consistent with and is supported by these letters; the
plaintiff's attempted denials of this conversation are not
worthy of belief and the letters themselves show that his
memory in this respect was faulty and very inaccurate.
Again we would urge upon this Court that the findings of
the trial judge should not be easily set aside in a case of
this kind as the weight and credence to be given the testimony of each witness can only be determined by the trier
of the fact.
Referring again to Exhibit J, it is our contention that
the plaintiff could not possibly have been thereafter further
misled. This letter and the conversation between Roland
and the plaintiff when they read this letter could have no
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other effect than to have put the plaintiff on notice that
Roland proposed to bid further on this property. And again
we urge the Court to remember that the plaintiff has never
charged the defendant, Roland Toombs, with having made
and thereafter breached any promise of any kind or with
having at any time committed any wrongful act.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND
CONCLUSION THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID
NOT OWN ANY PART OF THE LAND HERE
IN QUESTION.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST TO BE IMPOSED UPON
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED.

POINT III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO REOPEN THIS CASE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND
CONCLUSION THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID
NOT OWN ANY PART OF THE LAND HERE
IN QUESTION.
In the brief of appellant under the argument on this
point, counsel use a total of twenty-four pages to detail and
summarize the evidence favorable to them on both this
point and the succeeding one, and in these twenty-four
pages no authority of any kind is cited. We have under
the statement of facts in this respondents' brief summarized
the evidence favorable to the respondents. And, although
it is repetitious, we maintain that the only evidence, other
than the appellant's own statement, is contained in the
affidavit quoted in appellant's brief which affidavit was
never admitted in evidence.
It would be proper to conclude the argu1nent under
this point with the statement that this Court has many
times stated and held that it will not on appeal disturb the
findings of the trial court if there is any substantial evidence supporting those findings and we submit here that
there was a complete lack of evidence to support any other
finding. This Court has also recently stated that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
respondent upon appeal. Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127,
262 P. 2d 760, and J.lalstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4
Utah 2d 181, 290 P. 2d 689.
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POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE FULLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST TO BE IMPOSED UPON
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED.
Appellant commences his argument on this point with
reference to the alleged promise of the defendant, Alma
Toombs, to buy this property for appellant. We believe the
record fairly and reasonably shows and supports a finding
that, if any such promise had been made, it was rescinded.
But, and of much more significance is the question as to
what appellant proposes to do with the defendant, Roland
Toombs, who was at least a joint purchaser. No where in
his argument does he request that a constructive trust be
imposed as against Roland and in the entire brief of appellant there is not one reference to Exhibits A and J which
have been mentioned many times in this brief.
Corpus Juris Secundum in its treatise on trusts contains three general statements, all supported by a multitude
of cases, and any one of these three statements wholly and
completely and conclusively sustains the judgment entered
by the trial court on the facts as here presented.
The first statement reads as follows:
"More precisely, some fraudulent or unfair and
unconscionable conduct is essential to create a constructive trust, and there must be some unjust enrichment on the part of the trustee by something
passing from the beneficiary or from someone else
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on the beneficiary's behalf." 89 C. J. S. § 139 at p.
1022.
We submit that the trial court was entitled to find that no
evidence was presented sufficient to fulfill this requirement.

The second statement is this :
"Likewise, a denial that any trust exists, or a
resort to the statute of frauds to defeat the enforcement of a parol trust or obligation, is not such a
fraud as to give rise to a constructive trust." 89 C.
J. S. § 139 at p. 1024.
This statement needs no elaboration other than the comment that the statute of frauds itself is intended to discourage frauds and perjuries that would otherwise be committed by reason of the vagaries of the human mind and
memory.
And finally the statement is made that:
"A high and extrordinary degree of proof is
required in order to establish a constructive trust,
and the evidence must be clear, definite, unequivocal
and satisfactory, or such as to lead to but one conclusion, or as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the trust." 89 C. J. S. § 158 at p. 1079.
We cannot too greatly emphasize that the entire record falls
far short of the requirement thus imposed and would support only the result reached by the trial court.
The Utah case of Jensen v. Ho-zvell, 75 Utah 64, 282
Pac. 1034, holds that:

"* * * The general rule also is that, to establish a trust by parol, the evidence must be clear,
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unequivocal, and explicit, the property which is the
subject-matter of the trust clearly and distinctly,
and the purposes of the trust plainly, indicated, as
well as the person or persons who are to be the beneficiaries. Skeen v. Marriott, supra; 1 Perry on
Trusts, supra; Beach on Trusts, § 52. And, as expressed in many of the adjudicated cases, the evidence must be 'clear, satisfactory, and convincing.'
Sheenan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 58 P. 543, and
cases there cited." * * *
And, in this same case on page 1039 of the Pacific Reporter, the Court makes the following observations as to the
evidence in that case:
"Though the admissions as testified to by plaintiffs should be regarded as having been made, .yet
the testimony with respect thereto is as frail and
ineffectual to establish a trust in the property in
question as is the testimony of the plaintiffs as to
the declarations of the grantor prior to the making
of the transfers. The admissions as testified to are
just as equivocal, indefinite, and uncertain as to
the property, the subject-matter of the trust, the
nature, degree, and tenure of interest granted the
wife, and as to what was to be given the plaintiffs.
Such vague, indefinite, and enigmatical expressions
and statements as testified to as admissions, unsupported as they are by other facts and circumstances,
or by conduct of the parties, cannot be regarded as
being sufficient to create a trust and especially not
to overcome the admitted written evidence of the
conveyances and transfers of absolute and unconditional title of property possessed and controlled by
the grantee as her own for these many years, and
thereby divest her or her heirs of such title. Even
though the whole of the evidence on behalf of the
plaintiffs, when considered together, be regarded as
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sufficient to support a finding of the alleged trust,
yet, when the whole of the evidence in the record,
that of the plaintiffs and of the defendants, and all
the facts and circumstances shown therein, are considered together, we think it manifest that such a
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence."
In the case of Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham, 109
P. 2d 463, 56 Wyo. 314, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
states:
"If we assume, however, that Kingham made
the statement that he would protect plaintiff along
with himself, the statement is altogether too vague
and indefinite upon which to found a constructive
trust. Counsel for defendant thinks that it means
that defendant would protect plaintiff in the pending suit, but that there was nothing to protect. Perhaps so. We might conjecture numerous other
meanings. In Dunn v. Dunn, 59 Idaho 473, 83 P.
2d 4 71, 474, the court stated that 'a constructive
trust cannot arise out of vague, indefinite, ambiguous or casual statements or declarations. It must
be established by reasonably clear and definite
statements or declarations or equally clear and definite evidence of acts and conduct to that effect.'
In Rubin v. Midlinsky, supra [321 Ill. 436, 152 N. E.
219], the court stated that 'while counsel do not
clearly state the character of trust which they contend exists here, we gather that it is sought to establish a constructive trust. 'Vhile such trust may
be established by parol testimony, the proof must
be clear and convincing, and so strong, unequivocal,
and unmistakable as to lead to but one conclusion.'
3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 4 72, states: 'As
with the proof of express and resulting trusts, so in
the case of the establishment of constructive trusts,
the courts have announced that they require "clear
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and convincing" evidence. Other judicial expressions
are even stronger in their demands. "If the evidence
is doubtful or capable of reasonable explanation upon
a theory other than the existence of the trust, it is
not sufficient to support a decree declaring and enforcing the trust." Sometimes the requirement is
stated to be that the facts leading to the decree establishing the constructive trust must be proved "by
greater weight than the mere preponderance of the
evidence" or beyond a reasonable doubt. These
statements reflect judicial caution in accepting oral
evidence which is intended to contradict absolute
conveyances in deeds and wills and overturn record
titles.' "
Under all of the circumstances of this case and the
authorities above quoted, we respectfully urge that it would
have been error for the trial court to have imposed a constructive trust here.

POINT III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO REOPEN THIS CASE.
We have carefully read appellant's argument concerning this point as set forth in his brief and we are of the
opinion that he has answered it himself. If counsel for one
side or the other believe that their opposition is dilatory
in the preparation of such findings, the rules clearly permit
such counsel to prepare and submit the findings of their
own. We respectfully submit that the motion to reopen was
directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and nothing has been here presented to show an abuse of that discretion.
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On page 52 of appellant's brief appears the statement
"the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in refusing
to reopen the matter after more than five years had elapsed
from the submission of the case to it." Appellant again
assumes that there are facts in the record to support such
a contention whereas there are none.

CONCLUSION
This Court, in the recent case of Haws v. Jensen, 116
Utah 212, 209 P. 2d 229, said:
"The scope of the review of facts in equity cases
has long been settled in this jurisdiction. In Stanley
v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465, 466, we quoted
with approval from Olivers v. El.tJganti, 61 Utah 475,
214 P. 313, 315, where we stated that in equity cases,
'the findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that the court has misapplied proven facts or
made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence.'"
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial court
is entitled to the full affirmance of this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE M. MASON,
Attorney for Respondents.
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